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A Proposal for Early Impact, 
Persistent, and Cost-Effective 
Job Creation Policies
Due to the recession, the U.S. 
economy has lost over 10 million jobs. 
Job creation rarely receives the focus 
it deserves in fi scal stimulus proposals, 
either in the one that has already been 
enacted or in many of the proposals 
currently being considered. 
Job creation deserves greater focus 
because joblessness has large long-run 
economic costs. Because conventional 
fi scal stimulus does not focus on 
job creation—job creation is only a 
byproduct of boosting gross domestic 
product (GDP)—this fi scal stimulus 
is relatively costly per job created. As 
a result, current and proposed fi scal 
stimulus cannot create enough jobs at 
politically acceptable costs to meet the 
current job needs in the United States. If 
we are to suffi ciently address these needs 
without overly adding to the budget 
defi cit, we need to make job creation 
a central goal of a new fi scal stimulus 
package. This package must have a low 
cost per job created, address near-term 
job needs, and have persistent effects 
over the next several years.
Why Creating Jobs Is as Important as 
Generating GDP
Much of the debate over fi scal 
stimulus focuses on GDP multiplier 
effects. The number of jobs created 
receives less attention.
Job creation deserves special focus 
because of the enormous costs of 
joblessness in the long run. Joblessness 
erodes the unemployed’s self-confi dence 
and job skills, and damages their 
reputations with employers. Lengthy 
unemployment reduces a worker’s 
employment rates and wage rates in 
the long run.1 Therefore, combating the 
recession should place a great emphasis 
on creating jobs, not just on boosting 
GDP. The long-run productivity of 
many workers and the economy will be 
enhanced by antirecession policies that 
stress job creation, even if they do not 
have greater effects on GDP. 
The Need for Immediate and Persistent 
Job Creation Policies
If joblessness damages long-run 
economic prospects, then the current 
recession is a disaster with long-run 
consequences. Losing millions of jobs 
not only imposes current pain, it also 
damages long-run economic productivity. 
Since the start of the recession in 
December 2007, the employment-to-
population ratio has dropped from 62.7 
percent to 58.2 percent (as of December 
2009). To restore employment conditions 
to prerecession levels, the economy 
would need an additional 10.7 million 
jobs.
Even though GDP has begun to 
recover, the labor market will likely have 
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large employment defi cits for the next 
several years. In the last two recessions, 
employment-to-population rates did not 
increase from their trough level by more 
than 0.2 percent for more than two and a 
half years after the recovery in GDP had 
begun. If our current recovery in GDP 
began in mid-2009, history suggests that 
the employment-to-population ratio will 
not rise signifi cantly above its current 
level until the beginning of 2012. One 
study fi nds that the U.S. economy will 
be short of 2007 employment rates by 
10.7 million jobs in 2010, 8.5 million 
jobs in 2011, and 5.1 million jobs in 2012 
(Schmitt and Baker 2009). Other analysts 
project that it will be seven years before 
unemployment rates dip below 5 percent 
(Baily 2009; Thoma 2009). 
These employment defi cits are 
occurring despite the $787 billion fi scal 
stimulus package passed in February 
2009. The stimulus package is helping, 
but it is insuffi cient. Estimates from the 
Council of Economic Advisers (2009a, 
2010) suggest that the stimulus has added 
over 1.5 million jobs so far and that it 
may add another 2 million jobs by the 
end of 2010. But the employment defi cit 
numbers given above are after these job 
creation effects. Without the stimulus, we 
would be short even more jobs. 
Targeted Job Creation Policies 
Are More Cost-Effective Than 
Conventional Fiscal Stimulus Policies
These large employment defi cits are 
diffi cult to reduce through conventional 
fi scal stimulus, which focuses on reviving 
demand for goods and services through 
tax cuts or increased public spending. 
Job creation is a by-product of reviving 
demand. More targeted job creation 
policies, which directly increase jobs 
relative to GDP, are much less costly per 
job. 
In the $787 billion fi scal stimulus 
package, the average cost of creating 
one job per year was $112,000. Tax cuts 
are estimated to cost $145,000 per job 
created, state fi scal relief is estimated to 
cost $117,000 per job created, and direct 
federal government spending is estimated 
to cost $92,000 per job created (Council 
of Economic Advisers 2009a). The “Cash 
for Clunkers” program has an estimated 
cost per job created of $86,000 (Council 
of Economic Advisers 2009b). “Cash 
for Caulkers” is estimated to have a cost 
per job created of $80,000 (Hendricks 
et al. 2009). Increases in unemployment 
benefi ts have an estimated cost per job 
created of around $95,000.2 
With costs of about $100,000 per 
job created, it is diffi cult to have a 
conventional fi scal stimulus package 
large enough to signifi cantly reduce 
our employment defi cits.3 Suppose 
we wanted to create 5 million jobs in 
2010 and 4 million jobs in 2011, which 
would address a little less than half of 
the expected employment defi cits in 
those years. At a cost per job created of 
$100,000, the fi scal stimulus package 
necessary to reach these job goals would 
total another $900 billion. But the new 
fi scal stimulus/job creation packages that 
are thought to be currently politically 
feasible are much smaller. For example, 
in December 2009 the U.S. House of 
Representatives passed by only fi ve 
votes a $154 billion jobs/fi scal stimulus 
package. Perhaps a bigger stimulus 
package can be considered, but a package 
close to the size of the original stimulus 
seems politically implausible. 
Targeted job creation policies are more 
cost-effective than conventional fi scal 
stimulus because these targeted policies 
encourage employers to increase the ratio 
of jobs to GDP. Targeted job creation 
policies are around three times as cost-
effective as conventional fi scal stimulus: 
$35,000 per job versus $100,000. The 
recent Job Creation Tax Credit proposal, 
which would provide employers with a 
wage subsidy for payroll expansions, has 
a gross cost per job created of $29,000 
(Bartik and Bishop 2009). One public 
service jobs program, the Minnesota 
Emergency Employment Development 
program (MEED), has a gross cost per 
job created of $34,000 (Bartik 2009). 
Other public service jobs proposals have 
a gross cost per job created of $40,000 
(Economic Policy Institute 2009). Finally, 
“work sharing” proposals (Abraham 
and Houseman 2009), which encourage 
employers to reduce working hours rather 
than lay off workers, have a gross cost 
per job saved of $32,000 (Baker 2009).   
The net costs of job creation programs 
will be reduced because more jobs and 
greater GDP will increase tax revenues 
and reduce social spending. Targeted 
job creation proposals may have fi scal 
benefi ts of about $20,000 per job created 
(Bartik and Bishop 2009), which reduces 
the net cost to about $15,000 per job 
created. Due to larger effects on GDP, 
conventional fi scal stimulus will have 
larger fi scal benefi ts: $40,000 per job 
created.4 Net costs of conventional fi scal 
stimulus per job created will then be 
around $60,000, but targeted job creation 
is still four times as effective in creating 
jobs, per dollar of net costs. 
Options for a Job Creation Package
A possible stimulus package targeted 
only at job creation could include three 
components: 1) tax credits for employers 
creating jobs, 2) payments to employers 
for work sharing, and 3) public service 
job creation (see Table 1). This package 
would aim to create 5 million jobs in 
2010 and 4 million jobs in 2011, fi lling a 
little less than half of the expected jobs 
defi cit in each year. The gross cost of 
this package, as counted by the Offi ce 
of Management and Budget and the 
Congressional Budget Offi ce (CBO), 
would be $276 billion, with a little over 
half of that for 2010. However, after 
accounting for the package’s effects in 
increasing tax revenue and reducing 
social spending, the net cost of this two-
year package would be only $108 billion. 
The gross cost per job created is around 
$30,000; the net cost is about $12,000. 
Compared to the original fi scal 
stimulus of $787 billion, this job creation 
stimulus would have a gross cost only 
one-third as much. However, it would 
create 9 million “job-years” (5 million 
in 2010, 4 million in 2011)—about 
one-third greater than the original fi scal 
The current and proposed 
fi scal stimulus plans cannot 
create enough jobs at 
politically acceptable costs 
to meet the current job 
needs in the United States.
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stimulus’s estimated effect of creating 6.8 
million “job-years.” (One job created for 
one year is one “job-year.”) About half 
of the package would be a tax credit for 
employers adding to payroll, one-quarter 
would go to subsidies encouraging 
employers to offer work sharing, and 
one-quarter would go to the creation of 
public service jobs. 
Tax credits for job creation and 
subsidies for work sharing could very 
quickly be put into effect. And contrary 
to some comments (McArdle 2009), 
it is feasible to expand public service 
jobs quite quickly to the 1.1 million 
job slots of this package.5 During the 
Great Depression, the Civil Works 
Administration created 4.3 million jobs 
in two months, and the Works Progress 
Administration created 2.7 million 
jobs within eight months (Kesselman 
1978; Howard 1943). More recently, 
in 1983 MEED created the equivalent 
nationally of 500,000 jobs within six 
months.6 Rapid public service job 
creation is quite feasible if government 
administrators are given strong 
incentives to reach job creation goals in 
a timely fashion. 
What if policymakers want fi scal 
stimulus to also achieve other goals in 
addition to job creation? For example, 
they may also want to extend access 
to unemployment benefi ts or maintain 
state and local public services. A fi scal 
stimulus package can also achieve 
these goals, but only at higher costs 
or some sacrifi ce of job creation. We 
could add $100 billion to the package 
in conventional fi scal stimulus, which 
at $100,000 per job would create about 
1 million jobs. We could then still 
create 9 million jobs if we reduced job 
creation stimulus to $246 billion. The 
fi scal stimulus package would then have 
to be $346 billion to achieve the same 
job creation goals. Alternatively, we 
could keep the overall package at $276 
billion by letting the $100 billion in 
conventional fi scal stimulus replace $100 
billion in targeted job creation stimulus. 
But then the package’s job creation 
would be lowered from 9 million jobs to 
6.7 million jobs.
Policymakers must decide the 
importance of job creation versus other 
goals of fi scal stimulus. If it is important 
to create a signifi cant number of jobs at 
politically feasible costs—and economic 
research suggests that short-term job 
creation is important to long-term 
economic prospects—then targeted job 
creation policies should be a major part 
of any new fi scal stimulus package. 
Notes
1. The long-run loss of earnings due to 
unemployment is at least one-fi fth of the 
short-run effects. For example, displaced 
workers suffer a 25 percent loss of earnings 
in the year of displacement. Ten years later, 
displaced workers still suffer a 6 percent 
earnings loss (Stevens 1997). As another 
example, graduating from college in a year 
with 1 percent higher unemployment initially 
reduces the graduate’s wages by 6 percent. 
Fifteen years later, these unlucky graduates’ 
wages are still 2.5 percent lower (Kahn 
forthcoming). As a fi nal example, when state 
employment declines, about two-thirds of the 
drop is refl ected initially in state residents 
having a lower employment-to-population 
ratio (one-third is refl ected in lower state 
population). After 17 years, the employment-
to-population ratio in the state is still lower, 
by about 25 percent of the initial shock to 
employment (Bartik, 2001, pp. 141–145).
2. This is based on taking the midpoint 
of the CBO’s November 2009 estimates 
that such transfer payments have a GDP 
multiplier somewhere between 0.8 and 2.2. I 
also use the Council of Economic Advisers’ 
estimates (2009a) that a 1 percent increase 
in GDP is needed to induce 1 million new 
jobs. At current GDP levels of $14.2 trillion, 
this implies a GDP per job created fi gure of 
$142,000. Dividing by 1.5 yields $95,000.
3. The reason conventional fi scal stimulus 
measures cost $100,000 per job created can 
be explained intuitively: they only indirectly 
boost job creation by increasing output 
demand. Suppose one dollar of fi scal stimulus 
increases demand for GDP by one dollar (a 
multiplier of 1.0), and that a boost to GDP 
increased job creation by the average ratio of 
GDP to jobs, which is $105,000 (Council of 
Economic Advisers 2009a). Then the cost per 
job created of conventional fi scal stimulus 
would be $105,000. Some conventional 
fi scal stimulus may have multipliers greater 
than 1, which would lower the cost per job 
created. But boosts to GDP during a recession 
may raise GDP by a greater percentage than 
employment by increasing weekly work hours 
and worker productivity per hour. Even with 
fi scal multipliers of 1.5, it is diffi cult for the 
cost per job created to be much less than 
$100,000.
4. Based on CBO data, Bartik and Bishop 
(2009) estimate fi scal benefi ts of 38 percent of 
the GDP boost. If conventional fi scal stimulus 
has a GDP-to-job created ratio of $105,000, 
then fi scal benefi ts per job created will be 38 
NOTE: Gross costs are costs as counted by budget agencies, without allowing for any effects of 
programs on job creation and GDP generation. Net costs allow for estimated increases in jobs 
and GDP and resulting effects on tax revenue and social spending. 
SOURCE: Estimated effects for the Job Creation Tax Credit are from Bartik and Bishop (2009); 
for work sharing, Baker (2009); for public service jobs programs, my unpublished estimates for 








Jobs created (millions) 2010 2.8 1.3 0.9 5.0
2011 2.3 0.7 1.0 4.0
Two-year total 5.1 2.0 1.9 9.0
Gross costs ($, billions) 2010 80 43 31 154
2011 67 21 34 122
Two-year total 147 64 65 276
Net costs ($, billions) 2010 13 30 17 60
2011 14 15 19 48
Two-year total 27 45 36 108
Table 1  A Possible Jobs Package
Targeted job creation policies 
are around three times as 
cost effective as conventional 
fi scal stimulus: $35,000 
per job versus $100,000. 
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percent of $105,000, which is around $40,000. 
Targeted job creation proposals have lower 
effects on GDP per job created, which reduces 
their fi scal benefi ts to around $20,000 per job.
5. To create 0.9 million jobs through public 
service jobs requires somewhat more job 
slots. The model assumes some substitution 
of public service job slots for jobs that would 
have been created anyway, as well as some 
multiplier effects of this spending for public 
service jobs.
6. Personal communication between the 
author and former MEED administrators.
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The primary goals of the U.S. 
pension system are to provide secure 
and adequate retirement income and to 
cover all or most workers. In each of 
these respects, the system needs better 
solutions. With the decline in defi ned 
benefi t (DB) plans and the increasing 
reliance on 401(k) plans, future retirees 
will have less secure and less adequate 
retirement income than current retirees.
These issues are addressed in the book 
Pension Policy: The Search for Better 
Solutions, which was recently published 
by the Upjohn Institute (see p. 7). This 
article summarizes the main policy 
recommendations from the book.
Policy Recommendations for 
401(k) Plans
Since the 1980s, the role of 401(k) 
plans has changed from being mainly 
supplementary, offered by employers who 
also offer a DB plan, to often being the 
only plan employers provide. However, 
401(k) plan regulation has lagged in 
recognizing its increasingly important 
role. 
The regulation of 401(k) plans should 
be changed so that two types of plans 
would be recognized. First, 401(k) 
retirement plans would be the primary or 
sole plan provided by an employer and 
would be regulated as retirement plans 
rather than savings plans. The goal here 
is to close the regulatory gap between 
DB plans and 401(k) plans. For example, 
the 401(k) retirement plan would be 
required to offer an annuity as the default 
payout option, with spousal consent 
for not taking a joint and survivor’s 
annuity, similar to the spousal protections 
provided by DB plans.
The second type, a 401(k) savings 
plan, would be offered by employers that 
also offer DB plans meeting minimum 
standards as to generosity. These plans 
would continue to be regulated as they 
currently are, refl ecting their historical 
roots as secondary plans that supplement 
DB plans. Having this two-tier regulation 
of 401(k) plans could encourage 
employers to offer DB plans because it 
would permit them to offer 401(k) plans 
meeting less rigorous standards.
Participants in 401(k) plans often 
unknowingly bear the plan’s investment 
costs and typically also the administrative 
costs. The fees they pay (in dollars), as 
well as the expense ratio for investment 
expenses, should be disclosed on annual 
and quarterly account statements. This 
type of disclosure is done in Australia 
for administrative fees and by the Janus 
mutual funds for investment costs.
While the focus of much pension 
research is on inertia by pension 
participants, a seldom discussed 
problem with the coverage provided by 
defi ned contribution plans is the lack of 
persistency of contributions by many 
workers. The lack of persistency explains 
in part the surprisingly low account 
balances that many 401(k) participants 
have. Policy has not been developed to 
address this problem.
Policy Recommendations for Defi ned 
Benefi t Plans
Some analysts consider the decline 
in DB plans as an inevitable outcome 
because those plans are unable to 
adapt to a changing economic and 
demographic environment. A number of 
policies could be considered, however, 
based on the view that their endangered 
status is due in part to their regulatory 
environment.  
Private sector DB plans are the 
only major type of pension plan in 
the United States that does not permit 
employee tax deductible contributions. 
Those contributions are permitted for 
401(k) and DB plans for state and local 
government employees. Extending tax 
deductibility to private sector DB plan 
participants would help level the playing 
fi eld between DB and 401(k) plans. 
The increase in life expectancy 
appears to have contributed to the decline 
in DB plans, because DB plans are not 
fl exibile enough to deal readily with 
this continued rise in cost. In the United 
States, some plans have reduced their 
generosity, but generally this change is 
only done for new hires and thus has 
limited effect on the plan sponsor’s costs. 
Life expectancy risk can be divided 
into the idiosyncratic risk that a particular 
individual will live longer than expected 
and the cohort risk that an entire cohort 
on average will live longer than expected. 
Annuity providers are able to manage 
idiosyncratic risk by pooling it across 
large numbers of people, effectively 
diversifying it away. However, cohort 
risk cannot be pooled because it is 
correlated across participants. Life 
expectancy indexing of benefi ts is one 
way of dealing with this risk. With 
that approach, cohort risk is borne by 
workers, who are the benefi ciaries of the 
improved life expectancy and thus are 
best able to bear the risk.
A policy innovation, following the 
Notional Defi ned Contribution plan 
in Sweden, would be to permit life 
expectancy indexing of benefi ts at 
retirement. For each new retirement 
cohort, the generosity of the plan would 
be adjusted downward to refl ect the trend 
toward greater life expectancy. Under 
current U.S. law, this innovation would 
be prohibited because it would violate 
the anticutback rule, which is defi ned 
in terms of annual benefi ts. If that rule 
were redefi ned to take an economist’s 
perspective and use lifetime benefi ts as 
the measure, life expectancy indexing 
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With the decline in defi ned 
benefi t plans, future retirees 
will have less secure retirement 
income than current retirees.
The role of 401(k) plans has 
changed from being mainly 
supplementary to often being 
the only plan employers provide.
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The tax system could be used to 
encourage broader coverage through DB 
plans. For example, to tie the interests 
of management to those of workers, the 
allowable maximum income considered 
for determining DB plan benefi ts could 
be raised in plans that provide coverage 
to all full-time workers. Another option 
could require employers that provide a 
DB plan for management to also provide 
a similar plan for employees.
Workers in DB plans who are laid 
off suffer losses on the benefi ts they 
have already accrued. Their benefi ts 
are frozen in nominal terms at layoff, 
and the real value of those benefi ts is 
eroded by infl ation between that point 
and the point at which they qualify for 
retirement benefi ts. DB plans can make 
these workers wait until age 65 to receive 
benefi ts. For laid-off workers, the loss of 
pension benefi ts can be more serious than 
the loss of wages, while for employers 
the loss of pension benefi ts gives them a 
bonus for laying off workers. 
One policy option is to require 
fi rms that lay off workers in corporate 
restructuring to price index the benefi ts 
of those workers until retirement. This 
obligation in a certain sense would not 
impose a new cost on employers, it just 
would mandate that they pay the benefi ts 
to these workers that they had promised 
to pay assuming continued employment. 
Funding rules prohibit employers 
from contributing to DB plans in years 
that funding exceeds a certain level. 
This requirement of zero contributions 
generally occurs when the stock market 
and companies are performing well. 
Because pension plans are long-term 
commitments, and because of the 
fl uctuations in the stock market, at a later 
date plan sponsors then generally are 
required to contribute. This requirement 
generally occurs when the stock market 
and companies are performing poorly. 
The temporal pattern of contributions 
not only increases the volatility of 
contributions, it forces plan sponsors to 
contribute on a schedule that is exactly 
opposite to what they would choose. 
To reduce the volatility and timing 
problem of employer contributions 
for DB plan funding, the maximum 
contribution requirements can be eased. 
For example, plans could be allowed 
to contribute 25 percent of the normal 
cost any year, regardless of the level of 
funding, thus allowing plan sponsors 
to contribute every year. This is the 
desired pattern for pension plans, which 
are ongoing entities that are accruing 
liabilities every year.
Losing track of pensions is a problem 
for workers who are laid off or who 
change jobs. It can be diffi cult for a 
worker to fi nd a pension from a former 
employer, particularly if that employer 
has gone out of business. Both the United 
Kingdom and Australia have gone further 
than the United States in assisting people 
The fees that participants 
pay (in dollars), as well as the 
expense ratio for investment 
expenses, should be disclosed 
on annual and quarterly 
account statements.
facing this problem. A national registry, 
perhaps as an expansion of the registry 
maintained by the Pension Benefi t 
Guaranty Corporation, would be an 
improvement in this area.
Conclusions
Pension policy is an evolving 
product of social institutions and the 
economy. With the decline in DB plans 
and the increasing role of 401(k) plans, 
improvement is needed in the way 
pensions are provided to U.S. workers. 
The regulation of 401(k) plans needs 
to be updated to recognize that they 
generally are no longer supplementary 
plans. Policies need to be enacted to 
strengthen DB plans by making them 
more fl exible and improving the ways 
they are funded.
John A. Turner is the director of the 
Pension Policy Center.
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Better Solutions
John A. Turner
In his latest book, John A. Turner 
tackles the current problems facing 







of defi ned 




the problems inherent in the current 
pension system; and presents possible 
solutions to those problems based on 
lessons gleaned from the retirement 
system experiences of more than a 
dozen other industrialized countries. 
Key policy issues addressed include:
• How can pension coverage be 
increased?
• Should defi ned benefi t plans be 
saved, and if so, what can be done?
• How can annuitization be 
increased in defi ned contribution 
plans?
• How should pension policy adjust 
to continuing increases in life 
expectancy?
Readers seeking an overall 
introduction to pension policy will be 
rewarded by reading the book from 
cover to cover; other readers may fi nd 
it more profi table to read individual 
chapters for Turner’s analyses of issues 
of particular interest. In either case, 
this book offers specifi c solutions 
aimed at improving pension policy, and 
ultimately the lives of retirees, in the 
United States and elsewhere.
243 pp. $40 cloth 978-0-88099-355-5




Essays in Honor of 
Vernon M. Briggs Jr.
Charles J. Whalen, Editor
“This marvelous book is not simply 
a festschrift in honor of one of the 
fi nest human resource economists on 
the planet, but a 
spectacular set of 
well-researched 
essays by leading 
social scientists 
reminding us of 
the great debate 
over the causes 
of unemployment 
and inequality 
in U.S. labor 
markets that fi rst took place in the early 
1960s. This volume’s fi rst-rate analysis 
of structural unemployment, training, 
immigration policy, and the economics 
of disability should not be missed.”
—Barry Bluestone, Dean, School 
of Public Policy and Urban Affairs, 
Northeastern University
“Vernon Briggs has long been 
a prolifi c and infl uential scholar 
advocating for progressive and humane 
labor market policies. This book does 
full justice to his career by including 
wide-ranging and useful essays on 
immigration, education, job training, 
disability policy, and workforce 
intermediaries. These chapters will 
be of interest to both researchers and 
policymakers as they consider how to 
rebuild labor market institutions in the 
face of the dramatic transformations 
that we have witnessed in recent years.” 
—Paul Osterman, Nanyang 
Technological University Professor of 
Human Resources and Management, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
305 pp. $40 cloth 978-0-88099-361-6
$20 paper 978-0-88099-359-3. 2010.
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Prosperity in the 
New Economy?
Business Organization and 
High-Tech Employment 
in the United States
William Lazonick
Can the United States refashion 
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key question, Lazonick provides
• historical analysis of the rise of the 
“New Economy Business model” 
(NEBM), from its beginnings in 
Silicon Valley in the 1960s to the 
Internet boom of the late 1990s;
• analysis of how important Old 
Economy fi rms restructured in 
attempts to transition from the 
“Old Economy business model” 
(OEBM) to NEBM;
• analysis of the relationship 
between employment security and 
retirement security under both 
OEBM and NEBM; and
• a discussion of the implication for 
sustainable prosperity of the rise 
and dominance of NEBM.
Overall, this is a book that anyone 
interested in the U.S. high-tech labor 
force, the globalization of the ICT 
industry, and, particularly, the means 
by which an advanced economy can 
achieve sustainable prosperity will fi nd 
indispensable.
357 pp. $45 cloth 978-0-88099-351-7
$25 paper 978-0-88099-350-0. 2009. 
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